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TAXATION

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF NET INCOIE

UNDER § 446(b) OF THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
JOHN

J. HARPJNGTON

The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in § 446(b)
that where
... no method of accounting has been regularly used
by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly
reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall
be made under such method as in the opinion of the Secretary or his delegate does clearly reflect income. I
Possibly the most widely known of the methods employed by
the Commissioner under the authority of this section is the
net worth method. 2 However, there are several alternative
methods and combinations of methods of reconstruction not
uncommonly used by the Commissioner, including the excess
cash expenditures method, the bank deposit method and the
percentage markup method. This note will consider some of
the principles and guidelines applicable to the use of these
latter methods.
The excess cash expenditures method is derived from the
better known net worth method. However, the cash expenditure method is concerned with the expenditures made by the
taxpayer during the taxable year in question as an indication
of his correct net income, while the net worth method infers
income from the acquisition of assets. The logic of both
methods is similar: Purchases by the taxpayer during an accounting period in excess of his declared income must represent undeclared income, after adjustment is made for nontaxable items, savings and other likely sources of capital for
which the taxpayer can offer an explanation. The methods are
in reality two sides of the same coin and the limitations placed
on the use of the net worth method in the leading case of
I INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 446(b).
2 See Schwab, The Civil Aspects of the Net Worth Method, 3 WVM. & MARY

L. REV. 65 (1961).
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Hollandv. U. S. 3 are equally applicable to the cash expenditure
method, with one notable exception. Under both methods,
according to the requirements of Holland,4 the government
must overcome any non-taxable explanations offered by the
taxpayer which would account for his purchasing power, if
they are reasonably capable of being checked, as well as offering some positive suggestions as to a likely source of taxable
income. The chief distinction between the two methods,
insofar as the burden of the government's proof is concerned,
is found in the computation of the opening net worth figure
it is attempting to confer on the taxpayer. Under the net worth
method, the government must establish a reliable opening
net worth figure, but the Tax Court has held that a determination of opening net worth is unnecessary when using the
expenditure method, 5 at least where the taxpayer keeps no
books or records. Although the court admitted that use of
the expenditure method carried with it the implication that
the taxpayer did not make expenditures from wealth accumulated prior to the period, it found that use of the method was
not unreasonable on its face, where the taxpayer could not
disprove the Commissioner's determination.
It is a logical consequence of the holding that no opening
net worth figure is necessary under the expenditure method
and an erroneous computation of that figure does not require
court disapproval of the entire deficiency, and it has been so
held 6 in a case where the taxpayer's evidence as to the cash
on hand was insufficient, it being based on uncorroborated
testimony.
Specific court approval of the expenditure method in civil
fraud cases was given in the Mundy case, 7 while its application
to the criminal fraud area was considered and approved by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Johnson.8
3 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
4 Id.
5 Joseph A. Mundy, 24 P-H Tax C. Mem. 155,270 (1955).
6 Homer L. Blackwell, 30 P-H Tax Ct.Mem. ff 61,124 (1961).
Supra note 5.
8 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
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The argument has been made that the Code does not give
any authority in § 446(b) for the use of the expenditure method
where the taxpayer has books and records from which income can be computed, but should be restricted to the situation where no adequate books and records exist. A similar
argument was advanced in opposition to the net worth theory.
However, two circuit courts are in agreement that the existence of books and records does not preclude application
of the expenditure method any more than it forestalls the use
of its parent, the net worth method. These courts have found
that, similar to the net worth method, the expenditure approach
is not a method of accounting, but evidence of unreported
income which the Commissioner may resort to under § 446(b). 9
Most of the litigation surrounding the use of the expenditure method, aside from challenges to the Commissioner's
opening net worth figures, has centered about the adjustments
which must be made to the computation for the estimated
reasonable living expenses of the taxpayer, which are added
to his proven expenditures and for non-taxable items which
would help to explain a portion of his undeclared purchasing
power. Again this is similar to the contentions normally
advanced by the adversaries in outright net worth method
cases, and there is no significant difference in the burden of
proof and evidence under either method. The taxpayer will
attempt to prove lower actual living expenses than that
estimated by the government, the existence of non-taxable
items overlooked in the Commissioner's determination, and
double inclusions of the same income items by the Commissioner (a frequent problem where checks drawn by the taxpayer are not accurately matched against his living expenses
or expenditures). As is the case under any reconstruction of
income method, where estimates play such an important role,
gaps of information will exist which must be clarified by the
litigant who would be successful.
A more inexact method is the bank deposit method, which
does not attempt to arrive at a net figure, as is the case with
both the net worth and expenditure methods, but merely
shows a discrepancy between actual and reported receipts. The
9 Hoffman v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 784 (3rd Cir. 1962); Goldberg v.

Commissioner, 239 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1956).
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discrepancy may be due to entirely innocent causes and
readily explained by the taxpayer. However, the increasing use
by the government of this method, as with all the methods of
income reconstruction, points the clear moral that supporting
documents and papers of the taxpayer be retained at least for
the period of the statute of limitations.
In common with the two methods previously mentioned,
the bank deposit method assumes no tax exempt items of
income or stores of cash from prior periods which would tend
to explain the discrepancy. The theory behind the method is
relatively simple and logical; the problems arise in connection
with the characterization to be assigned to individual components of the formula. Taxable bank deposits are adjusted
by adding items allegedly representing undeposited receipts
of income, such as business receipts immediately expended
either for the personal or business needs of the taxpayer.
Frequently, the expenditures supposedly so made are estimates
of what the taxpayer would reasonably have spent less that
which is proven to have been spent. Unreported income is
this total of expenditures and bank deposits less nontaxable
items, mere transfers, redeposits and items taxable in a different
year. 1o The total taxable receipts as thus reconstructed by the
Commissioner is then compared with the reported taxable
receipts and the taxpayer who can offer no reasonable or
convincing explanation for the discrepancy has a gloomy
prospect.
It is obvious that more danger of injustice is inherent in
this method than in the more frequently used net worth method
and the courts have accordingly acted to confine it. Unlike the
net worth and expenditure methods, the use of the bank
deposit method is more apt to incur court disapproval where
adequate books and records exist. I" Although a court has
stated that it will not prefer the use of the net worth method
over the bank deposit method 12 and the Tax Court permits
the use of the bank deposit method as evidence on the matter
10 1 P-H 1963 Fed. Tax Serv. ff 6891.
11R. W. Jackson, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. ff 48, 141 (1948); Harnsberger's,
Inc., 7 B.T.A. 250 (1927); Edward Walsdorf, 4 B.T.A. 367 (1926).
12

Miller v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1956).
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of whether the books reflect a true picture of income,13 still
the Commissioner may not act arbitrarily and illogically, as
where the taxpayer is on an accrual basis. The bank deposit
method in this situation would not be a proper criterion for
determining income. 14 It is especially to be noted in this
connection that where the Commissioner can be shown to
have acted arbitrarily, as where the Tax Court reduced by 85%
the Commissioner's original determination of a deficiency, 15
the burden of proof shifts from the taxpayer to the Commissioner, as the presumption in his favor is thereby lost. 1 The
taxpayer need not then prove the correct amounts.
As with the other methods of reconstructing income, gifts,
loans and funds acquired in prior periods may be used to
weaken the web woven by the bank deposit evidence. Thus,
the known bank deposits will be reduced by the amount of
loans the taxpayer can show to have been made or repaid to
him.17
A fourth method employed in the reconstruction of income
is the percentage mark-up method.
The Commissioner
determines an estimated profit margin which might reasonably
be applied to the taxpayer's business. The percentage is then
applied to some reliable book figure of the taxpayer's such as
sales or cost of goods sold, or gross profit, in order to arrive
at the reconstructed net income figure. The profit percentage
to be applied is determined by the Commissioner on the basis
of the taxpayer's own records in prior years, or similar taxpayers in an equivalent line of business. As with the bank
deposit method, the Commissioner may not act arbitrarily in
choosing his percentage, 's but neither is he required to use
another method in place of it.', However, the method will
1

3 James P. Haynes, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.
14 Sefer A. Markley, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.

1 60,221
ff48,056

(1960).
(1948).

15 Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1959).
16 Thomas v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 83 (6th Cir. 1955).
17 Grace 0. Dean, 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1 55,217 (1955).
18 Fresbel Restaurant Corp., 23 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. fT54,279 (1954).

19 Bernstein v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1959).
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be rejected where the taxpayer's books and records are deemed
to adequately reflect income. 2o
The taxpayer can, in addition to attacking the rate used,
show that it is not applicable to him, either because of a
special situation, such as where his business methods were
slipshod, so that he had a lower profit margin than the average
similarly situated taxpayer, 2 1 or excessive competition,22
or that in fact his business is not similar to the one from which
the Commissioner determined the rate. The percentage markup method has been utilized primarily in those areas where it
is customary not to keep adequate records, as is the case with
gamblers and others in illegal lines of business, or as is the
case with tips received by waiters and taxi drivers, those who
frequently neglect to record income received in extremely
small amounts.
Although these four methods of reconstructing taxable
income are the ones most generally used by the Commissioner
under the authority of §442(b), the present trend is away from
reliance on a single theory in a particular case, in favor of the
hybrid, or use of multiple theories. 23 This multiple approach
where no one method would have been successful has been
approved by at least one court. 2 4 Moreover, it has been
suggested that theories which had their origin in criminal
cases should now be applied to civil cases as well. 2s The
importance of becoming conversant with these lesser-known
theories of reconstruction of income, and their combinations,
cannot therefore be stressed too highly for the tax practitioner
and adviser who would serve his clients well.
20 Lunsford v. Commissioner, 212 F.2d 878 (5th Cir. 1954); Marvin T.
Blackwell, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1156,184 (1956).
21 William Stratman, 18 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1149,143 (1949).
22

Arthur Ward, 17 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.

48,132 (1948).

23 Schmidt, Hybrid Methods of Reconstructing Income in Criminal Tax Fraud

Cases, 47 A.B.A.J. 560 (June, 1961).
24 United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1956).
25 Schwab, The Civil Aspects of the Net Worth Method, 3 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 65, 66 (1961); Thomas v. Commissioner, 223 F.2d 83 (6th
Cif. 1955).

